tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29787038.post116275361839950167..comments2023-11-02T09:36:33.312-04:00Comments on Risingwind: Tom Grayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14728522824855808421noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29787038.post-1164224986540966052006-11-22T14:49:00.000-05:002006-11-22T14:49:00.000-05:00UCTE is still investigating: www.ucte.org/news. Th...UCTE is still investigating: <A HREF="http://www.ucte.org/news/" REL="nofollow">www.ucte.org/news</A>. They promise a report at the end of this month. They note that the motivation of Eon Netz's internal investigation is necessarily different than UCTE's.KMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08488532333076478228noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29787038.post-1163723670272619282006-11-16T19:34:00.000-05:002006-11-16T19:34:00.000-05:00Here is some commentary from E.ON Netz on the Euro...Here is some commentary from E.ON Netz on the Euro blackout. While it is still conceivable that wind was involved in some way, it clearly was not the primary cause of the event. More info will be posted here as it becomes available.<BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/>Thomas O. Gray<BR/>American Wind Energy Association<BR/><A HREF="http://www.awea.org" REL="nofollow">www.awea.org</A><BR/><A HREF="http://www.ifnotwind.org" REL="nofollow">www.ifnotwind.org</A><BR/><BR/><BR/>15.11.2006 <BR/> <BR/>Human error at control center chiefly responsible for power outage on 4 November <BR/> <BR/>E.ON Netz reports on status of investigations<BR/><BR/><BR/>According to the latest findings of E.ON's in-house investigation into the causes for the disruption to the European power grid on 4 November, that were submitted to the Federal Network Agency today, human error, as opposed to any technical malfunctions, was chiefly responsible for the outage.<BR/><BR/>Thanks to a detailed analysis of a comprehensive set of data, E.ON has already been able to largely reconstruct the chain of events that led to the disruption. The results show that an E.ON control center had assessed developments correctly and accordance with standard procedures but, owing to time pressure, had not made use of all technical options for a comprehensive situation analysis.<BR/><BR/>Prior to the scheduled deactivation of the ultra-high voltage transmission line that crosses the Ems River ahead of the passage of the Norwegian Pearl cruise ship, the control center had not checked whether the outage of an additional transmission line might overload the power grid. About half an hour later, another high voltage transmission line was overloaded - for reasons that are not yet known. To compensate for this, a number of lines were switched together at a substation. Contrary to the assessment of the control center's staff, this did not decrease but further increased the load on the power grid, which, in turn, triggered an automatic shutdown procedure. The outage of the second transmission line therefore ultimately set off the domino effect which led to the temporary disconnection of the European interconnected power grid.<BR/><BR/>There is, however, no evidence whatsoever of any technical malfunction of the transmission lines, control or monitoring systems involved. Findings to date indicate that all systems reacted correctly and in accordance with standard procedures, effectively preventing a complete blackout. Insufficient investment in maintenance or technical infrastructure can therefore be ruled out as causes for the disruption. <BR/><BR/>Further investigation is required until all remaining issues have been resolved. These, for instance, include the cause for the rapid and unexpected increase in electricity flows through the transmission lines in question. It is not until these issues have been fully investigated that possible improvement measures can be pinpointed. In doing so, E.ON Netz intends to work closely with the Federal Network Agency and all other parties involved.<BR/><BR/>Klaus-Dieter Maubach, the E.ON Energie Board of Management Member responsible for the power grid, issued the following statement on the matter: "We deeply regret the disruption to the power supply that affected many European electricity consumers as a result of the events of 4 November. We were quickly able to identify the main cause for the disruption but will continue to press ahead with our investigations until all remaining questions have been answered to our full satisfaction."Tom Grayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14728522824855808421noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29787038.post-1162841063562398732006-11-06T14:24:00.000-05:002006-11-06T14:24:00.000-05:00Yes, very true. I'm told by those who know that t...Yes, very true. I'm told by those who know that typically it takes three or four days for all the facts about a blackout to get sorted out. I'm also hearing that wind was <B>not</B> at fault, so I'll be interested to learn more.<BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/>Thomas O. Gray<BR/>American Wind Energy Association<BR/><A HREF="http://www.awea.org" REL="nofollow">www.awea.org</A><BR/><A HREF="http://www.ifnotwind.org" REL="nofollow">www.ifnotwind.org</A>Tom Grayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14728522824855808421noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29787038.post-1162834222588076272006-11-06T12:30:00.000-05:002006-11-06T12:30:00.000-05:00Some reports about this weekend's huge power outag...Some reports about this weekend's huge power outage in Europe suggest that either a surge or a dip in German wind energy infeed started it. Initial reports pointed out that Eon Netz had shut down one trunk line to let a ship leave a dockyard, but Eon Netz said they had done this before without incident.<BR/><BR/>The UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity) is reporting: "Island 1 [western part of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Italy, a part of Austria and Slovenia] was characterised by a power imbalance (lack of generation), due to the fact that German wind energy injected from the Northern region belonged to island 2. As a consequence, the frequency dropped in island 1 down to 49 Hz. This activated automatic load shedding procedures (cut of supply to customers) according to UCTE standards. Island 2 and 3 had to overcome a frequency overshoot due to power surplus."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com